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Abstract. We explore further the hardness of the non-dual discrete vari-
ant of the Ring-LWE problem for various number rings, give improved
attacks for certain rings satisfying some additional assumptions, con-
struct a new family of vulnerable Galois number fields, and apply some
number theoretic results on Gauss sums to deduce the likely failure of
these attacks for 2-power cyclotomic rings and unramified moduli.
1 Introduction
Lattice-based cryptography was introduced in the mid 1990s in two different
forms, independently by Ajtai-Dwork [1] and Hoffstein-Pipher-Silverman [12].
Thanks to the work of Stehle´-Steinfeld [19], we now understand the NTRU
cryptosystem introduced by Hoffstein-Pipher-Silverman to be a variant of a
cryptosystem which has security reductions to the Ring Learning With Errors
(RLWE) problem. The RLWE problem was introduced in [14] as a version of the
LWE problem [17]: both problems have reductions to hard lattice problems and
thus are interesting for practical applications in cryptography. RLWE depends
on a number ring R, a modulus q, and an error distribution. As such, it has
added structure (the ring), which allows for greater efficiency, but also in some
cases additional attacks.
The hardness of RLWE is crucial to cryptography, in particular as the basis
of numerous homomorphic encryption schemes [2,3,4,5,6,13,19]. One main the-
oretical result in this direction is the security reduction theorem in [14], which
reduces certain GapSVP problems in ideal lattices over R to RLWE, when the
RLWE error distribution is sufficiently large and of a prescribed form. Although
so far in practical cryptographic applications only cyclotomic rings are used, it
is important to study the hardness of RLWE for general number rings, moduli
and error distributions, so as to understand the boundaries of security in the pa-
rameter space. Recently, new attacks on the so-called non-dual discrete variant
of the RLWE problem for certain number rings, error distributions, and special
moduli were introduced [7,8,9,10,11]. The RLWE problem reduces to its discrete
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variant; and the non-dual RLWE problem is equivalent to the dual problem up
to a change in the error distribution, so that non-dual RLWE may be viewed
simply as a certain choice of error distribution in the parameter space of RLWE.
The term RLWE is sometimes reserved for spherical Gaussian distributions.
This paper is an extension of [9], and here we explore further the hardness
of the non-dual discrete variant of the RLWE problem for various number rings.
We:
1. construct a new family of vulnerable Galois number fields,
2. improve the runtime of the attacks for certain rings satisfying some addi-
tional assumptions, and
3. apply some number theoretic results on Gauss sums to deduce the likely
failure of these attacks for 2-power cyclotomic rings.
In cryptographic applications, it is most efficient to sample the error distri-
bution coordinate-wise according to a polynomial basis for the ring. For 2-power
cyclotomic rings, which are monogenic with a well-behaved power basis, it is
justified to sample the RLWE error distribution directly in the polynomial ba-
sis for the ring, according to results in [5,10,14], where this error distribution
choice is called Polynomial Learning With Errors (PLWE). Precisely, the PLWE
(polynomial error), RLWE (meaning a spherical Gaussian), and non-dual RLWE
problems are equivalent up to a scaling and rotation of the error distribution for
2-power cyclotomic fields. However, in general number rings the error distribu-
tion may be distorted by a general linear transformation when moving from one
problem to another [11]. For certain choices of ring and modulus, efficient attacks
on PLWE were presented in [10]. In [11], these attacks were extended to apply to
the decision version of the non-dual RLWE problem in certain rings, and in [8,9],
attacks on the search version of the RLWE problem for certain choices of ring
and modulus were presented.
1.1 Summary of contributions
– In Section 3, we present an improvement to the attack in [9, Section 4] and
use it to dramatically cut down the runtime of the attacks on the weak
instances found in [9, Section 5].
– In Section 4, we present a new infinite family of Galois number fields vul-
nerable to our attack in [9, Section 4], where the relative standard deviation
parameter is allowed to grow to infinity, and we give a table of examples.
– In Section 5, we analyze the security of 2-power cyclotomic fields with un-
ramified moduli under our attack. We prove Theorem 3, which gives an upper
bound on the statistical distance between an approximated non-dual RLWE
error distribution, reduced modulo a prime ideal q, and the uniform distribu-
tion on R/q. We conclude that the 2-power cyclotomic rings are safe against
our attack when the modulus q is unramified with small residue degree (1
or 2), and is not too large (q < m2).
Acknowledgements We thank Chris Peikert, Igor Shparlinski, Le´o Ducas
and Ronald Cramer for helpful discussions.
2 Background
2.1 Discrete Gaussian on lattices
Recall that a lattice in Rn is a discrete subgroup of Rn of rank n. For r > 0, let
ρr(x) = e
−||x||2/r2 .
Definition 1. For a lattice Λ ⊂ Rn and r > 0, the discrete Gaussian distribu-
tion on Λ with width r is:
DΛ,r(x) =
ρr(x)∑
y∈Λ ρr(y)
, ∀x ∈ Λ.
2.2 Non-dual RLWE
A non-dual discrete RLWE instance is specified by a ring R, a positive integer
q and an error distribution χ over R. Here R is normally taken to be the ring of
integers of some number field K of degree n. The integer q, called the modulus,
is often taken to be a prime number. We then fix an element s ∈ R/qR called
the secret.
Let ι : K → Rn be the adjusted canonical embedding defined as follows.
Suppose σ1, . . . , σr1 , σr1+1, . . . , σn are the distinct embeddings of K, such that
σ1, · · · , σr1 are the real embeddings and σr1+r2+j = σr1+j for 1 ≤ j ≤ r2. We
define ι : K → Rn by
x 7→ (σ1(x), · · · , σr1(x),
√
2 Re(σr1+1(x)),
√
2 Im(σr1+1(x)), · · · ,√
2 Re(σr1+r2(x)),
√
2 Im(σr1+r2(x))).
Then the non-dual discrete RLWE error distribution is the discrete Gaussian
distribution Dι(R),r.
Definition 2. Fix R, q, r as above. Let Rq denote the quotient ring R/qR. Then
a non-dual RLWE sample is a pair
(a, b = as+ e) ∈ Rq ×Rq,
where the first coordinate a is chosen uniformly at random in Rq, and e is a
sampled from the discrete Gaussian Dι(R),r, considered modulo q.
Definition 3 (Non-dual Search RLWE). Given arbitrarily many non-dual
RLWE samples, determine the secret s.
Definition 4 (Non-dual Decision RLWE). Given arbitrarily many samples
in Rq × Rq, which are either non-dual RLWE samples for a fixed secret s, or
uniformly random samples, determine which.
2.3 Comparing RLWE with non-dual RLWE
In the original work [14], the RLWE problem is introduced using the dual ring
R∨. Specifically, for the discrete variant, s ∈ R∨q := R∨/qR∨, and an RLWE
sample is taken to be of the form
(a, b = as+ e) ∈ Rq ×R∨q ,
where e is sampled from Dι(R∨),r, then considered modulo q.
If the dual ring R∨ is principal as a fractional ideal, i.e., R∨ = tR, then each
non-dual instance is equivalent to a dual instance, by mapping a sample (a, b) to
(a, tb), and vice versa. If R∨ is not principal, there are still inclusions R∨ ⊂ t1R
and R ⊂ t2R∨, so that one can reduce dual and non-dual versions of the problem
to one another. In either case, the reduction comes at the cost of distorting the
error distribution.
For the infinite family constructed in Section 4, the dual ring R∨ is indeed
principal (see Lemma 3 in Section 4). Note that multiplying by this field element
t changes a spherical Gaussian to an elliptical Gaussian, so the two equivalent
instances will have different error shapes.
Elliptical Gaussians are the most important class of error distributions for
general rings, since in [14, Theorem 4.1], the reduction from hard lattice problems
is to a class of RLWE problems where the distributions are elliptical Gaussians.
Theorem 5.2 of [14] provides a further security reduction to decision RLWE with
spherical Gaussian errors, but it is only stated for cyclotomic rings.
2.4 Comparing discrete and continuous errors
Restricting now to the non-dual setup, there are still two variants of RLWE based
on the form of the spherical errors: the continuous variant samples errors from
spherical Gaussian on the space KR = ι(K ⊗Q R) (here we extend ι linearly), so
that samples have the form
(a, b = as+ e) ∈ Rq ×KR/qR,
whereas the discrete variant samples from a discrete Gaussian DιR,r on the
lattice R, as defined above.
There is no known equivalence between the discrete problem and its con-
tinuous counterpart in general. However, the continuous problem reduces to
the discrete one. Specifically, given a continuous sample (a, b) ∈ Rq × KR/qR,
one can perform a rounding on the second coordinate to get a discrete sample
(a, [b]) ∈ Rq ×Rq. However, there is no obvious map in the reverse direction.
2.5 Search and decision RLWE problems
Let q be a prime ideal of K lying above q; then the RLWE problem modulo q
means discovering s mod q from arbitrarily many RLWE samples. In [14] the
authors gave a polynomial time reduction from search to decision for cyclotomic
number fields and totally split primes, using the RLWE modulo q as an interme-
diate problem. Their proof can be applied to prove a similar search-to-decision
reduction for non-dual RLWE, when the underlying number field is Galois and
the modulus q is unramified [9,10]. Moreover, the search-to-decision is most ef-
ficient when the residue degree of q is small. What is important in our paper is
that for the instances in Section 3 and 4, our attacks on RLWE modulo q could
be efficiently transferred to attack the search problem.
2.6 Comparing non-dual RLWE with PLWE for 2-power cyclotomic
fields
For cryptographic applications, it is perhaps natural to consider the PLWE error
distribution on R: assuming the ring R is monogenic, i.e., R = Z[x]/(f(x)), then
a sample from the PLWE error distribution is e =
∑n−1
i=0 eix
i, where the ei are
“small errors”, sampled independently from some error distribution over Z (e.g.
a discrete Gaussian distribution).
In general number fields, a PLWE distribution differs greatly from the non-
dual RLWE distribution (see [ELOS] for an effort to quantify the distance be-
tween the two distributions using spectral norms). However, for 2-power cyclo-
tomic fields it turns out that the two error distributions are equivalent up to a
factor of
√
n. Since this fact is used in Section 5, we give a proof below.
Lemma 1 Let m = 2d be a power of 2 and let R = Z[ζm]. Consider the PLWE
error distribution on R, i.e. samples e =
∑n−1
i=0 eiζ
i
m, where n = m/2 and each
ei follows the discrete Gaussian DZ,r. Then this PLWE distribution is equal to
the non-dual RLWE distribution Dι(R),r
√
n.
Proof. For an element x =
∑n−1
i=0 xiζ
i
m ∈ R, the probability of x being sampled
by the PLWE distribution is proportional to
∏n−1
i=0 ρr(xi) =
∏n−1
i=0 e
−x2i /r2 =
e−||x||
2/r2 . On the other hand, one checks that ||ι(x)|| = √n||x||. So the above
probability is proportional to e−||ι(x)||
2/nr2 , which is the exactly the same for the
distribution Dι(R),r
√
n. This completes the proof.
2.7 Scaling factors
As pointed out in [11], when analyzing the non-dual RLWE error distribution,
one needs to take into account the sparsity of the lattice ι(R), measured by its
covolume in Rn. This covolume is equal to |disc(K)|1/2. In light of this, we define
the scaled error width to be
r0 =
r
|disc(K)| 12n .
2.8 Overview of attack
We briefly review the method of attack in Section 4 of [9]. The basic principle
of this family of attacks is to find a homomorphism
ρ : Rq → F
to some small finite field F , such that the error distribution on Rq is transported
by ρ to a non-uniform distribution on F . In this case, errors can be distinguished
from elements uniformly drawn from Rq by a statistical test in F , for example,
by a χ2-test. The existence (or non-existence) of such a homomorphism depends
on the parameters of the field, prime, and distribution in the setup of RLWE.
In this section, we will describe parameters under which such a map exists.
Once such a map is known, the basic method of attack on Decision RLWE
is as follows:
1. Apply ρ to samples (a, b) in Rq ×Rq, to obtain samples in F × F .
2. Guess the image of the secret ρ(s) in F , calling the guess g.
3. Compute the distribution of ρ(b)−ρ(a)g for all the samples. If g = ρ(s), this
is the image of the distribution of the errors. Otherwise it is the image of a
uniform distribution.
4. If the image looks uniform, try another guess g until all are exhausted.
If any non-uniform distribution is found, the samples are RLWE samples.
Otherwise they are not.
Whenever q is a prime ideal lying above q, then reduction modulo q is a valid
map
ρ : Rq → Rq
for the attack above. This attack targets the RLWE modulo q problem for some
prime q lying above q, and as noted above, it can be turned into an attack on
the search variant of the problem, whenever q is unramified and K is Galois.
2.9 Comparison to related works
In an independent preprint ([7]) which appeared on eprint around the same time
as our preprint, Castryck et al. also constructed an infinite family of vulnerable
Galois number fields, where the error width can be taken to be O(|disc(K)| 1n−)
for any  > 0. The asymptotic error width they obtained is wider than in our
infinite family in Section 2. However, the method of attack is an errorless LWE
linear algebra attack (based on short vectors), whereas our family is not suscep-
tible to a linear algebra attack, and requires the novel techniques presented here
and in [9].
3 An improved attack using cosets
In this section, we describe an improvement to our chi-square attack on RLWE
mod q outlined in Section 2.8 for a special case. As a result, we have an updated
version of [9, Table 1], where we attacked each instance in the table in much
shorter time. Note that the complexity of the previous attack in this special case
is O(nq3). In contrast, our new attack has complexity O(nq2).
To clarify, the special case we consider in this section is characterised by the
following assumptions (we need not be in the special family of the next section):
– The modulus q is a prime of residue degree 2 in the number field K.
– There exists a prime ideal q above q such that the map ρ : Rq → Rq satisfies
the following property: Let e ∈ Rq be taken from the discrete RLWE error
distribution. The probability that ρ(e) lies in the prime subfield Fq of Fq2 is
computationally distinguishable from 1/q.
Granting these assumptions, we can distinguish the distribution of the “re-
duced error” ρ(e) from the uniform distribution on Fq2 . More precisely, the attack
in [9] works exactly as we described in Section 4: with access to Ω(q) samples,
one loops over all q2 possible values of ρ(s). It detects the correct guess ρ(s)
based on a chi-square test with two bins Fq and Fq2 \ Fq.
The distinguishing feature of the improved attack is to loop over the cosets
of Fq of Fq2 instead of the whole space. Fix t1, · · · tq to be a set of coset repre-
sentatives for the additive group Fq2/Fq. Recall that s denotes the secret and
ρ : Rq → Rq ∼= Fq2 is a reduction map modulo some fixed prime ideal q lying
above q. Then there exists a unique index i such that ρ(s) = s0 + ti for some
s0 ∈ Fq. Our improved attack will recover s0 and ti separately.
We start with an identity b = as+ e, where a, b, s, e ∈ Fq2 . We will regard s
as fixed and a, b, e as random variables, such that a is uniformly distributed in
Fq2 \ Fq and b is uniformly distributed in Fq2 . The reason why a is not taken to
be uniform will become clear later in this section. We use a bar to denote the
Frobenius automorphism, i.e.,
a¯
def
= aq, ∀a ∈ Fq2 .
Then b¯ = a¯s¯ + e¯. Using the identity s = s0 + ti and subtracting, we obtain
b¯− b− ati + ati = s0(a¯− a) + e¯− e. Since a 6= a¯, we can divide through by a¯− a
and get
b¯− b− ati + ati
a¯− a = s0 +
e¯− e
a¯− a. (**)
Now for each 1 ≤ j ≤ q, we can compute
mj(a, b) :=
b¯− b− atj + atj
a¯− a
with access to a and b, but without knowledge of s or s0. Note that mj is in the
prime field Fq by construction.
Proposition 1 For each 1 ≤ j ≤ q,
(1) If j 6= i, then mj(a, b) is uniformly distributed in Fq, for RLWE samples
(a, b).
(2) If j = i, then mj(a, b) = s0 +
e¯−e
a¯−a .
We postpone the proof of Proposition 1 until the end of this section. Assuming
the proposition, our improved attack works as follows: for 1 ≤ j ≤ q, we compute
a set of mj from the samples. To avoid dividing by zero, we ignore the samples
with ρ(a) ∈ Fq (which happens with probability 1/q since ρ(a) is uniformly
distributed). We then run a chi-square test on the mj values. If j 6= i, then the
distribution should be uniform; if j = i, then P (mi = s0) = P (e ∈ Fq), which
by our assumption is larger than 1/q. Hence if we plot the histogram of the mi
computed from the samples, we will see a spike at s0. So we could recover s0 as
the element with the highest frequency, and output ρ(s) = s0 + ti. We give the
pseudocode of the attack below.
Algorithm 1 Improved chi-square attack on RLWE modulo q)
Input: K – a number field; R – the ring of integers of K; q – a prime ideal in K above
q with residue degree 2; S – a collection of M RLWE samples; β > 0 – the parameter
used for comparing χ2 values.
Output: a guess of the value s (mod q), or NOT-RLWE, or INSUFFICIENT-
SAMPLES
Let G ← ∅.
for j in 1, . . . , q do
Ej ← ∅.
for a, b in S do
a¯, b¯← a (mod q), b (mod q).
mj ← b¯−b−atj+atja¯−a .
add mj to Ej .
end for
Run a chi-square test for uniform distribution on Ej .
if χ2(Ej) > β then
s0 := the element(s) in Ej with highest frequency.
s← s0 + tj , add s to G.
end if
end for
if G = ∅ then
return NOT-RLWE
else if G = {s} is a singleton then
return s
else
return INSUFFICIENT-SAMPLES
end if
We analyze the complexity of our improved attack. There are q iterations,
each operating on O(q) samples, and reduction of each sample is O(n). So our
new attack has complexity O(nq2).
3.1 Examples of successful attacks
To illustrate the idea, we apply our improved attack to the instances in Table
1 of [9]. Comparing the last column with the current Table 1, we see that the
runtime has been improved significantly.
Table 1. RLWE instances under our improved attack
n q f r0 no. samples old runtime (in minutes) new runtime (in minutes)
40 67 2 2.51 22445 209 3.5
60 197 2 2.76 3940 63 2.4
60 617 2 2.76 12340 8.2 ×105 (est.) 21.3
80 67 2 2.51 3350 288.6 0.5
90 2003 2 3.13 60090 6.6 ×104 (est.) 305
96 521 2 2.76 15630 4.5 ×103 (est.) 21.7
100 683 2 2.76 20490 1.6 ×104(est.) 36.5
144 953 2 2.51 38120 342.6 114.5
3.2 Proof of Proposition 1
For notational convenience, we let Aq denote the set Fq2 \ Fq.
Lemma 2 Let the random variable a be uniformly distributed in Aq. Suppose e
is a random variable with value in Fq2 independent of a. Fix δ ∈ Aq and s0 ∈ Fq.
Then
mδ = gδ + s0 +
e¯− e
a¯− a
is uniformly distributed in Fq. Here
gδ =
aδ − aδ
a¯− a .
Proof. Since the uniform distribution is invariant under translation, we may
assume s0 = 0. We introduce a new set V = {x ∈ Fq2 : x¯ = −x}. We claim
that for any c, d ∈ V with c 6= 0, we have P (a¯ − a = c, aδ − aδ = d) = 1q(q−1) .
To prove the claim, note that V is an Fq-vector space of dimension one, and we
have the following Fq-linear map fδ : Fq2 → V 2.
fδ : a 7→ (a¯− a, aδ − aδ).
First we show fδ is injective: if fδ(a) = 0, then a ∈ Fq and thus a(δ¯ − δ) = 0, so
a = 0. By dimension counting, fδ is an isomorphism. Restricting to Aq, we see
that fδ|Aq gives an isomorphism between Aq and (V \ {0})×V . This proves the
claim.
Let e′ = e¯−ea¯−a . For any z ∈ Fq, we have
P (gδ + e
′ = z)
=
∑
x+y=z
P (gδ = x, e
′ = y)
=
∑
x+y=z
∑
c∈V \{0}
P (a¯δ − aδ = xc, e¯− e = yc, a¯− a = c)
=
∑
x+y=z,c∈V \{0}
P (a¯δ − aδ = xc, a¯− a = c)P (e¯− e = yc)
=
1
q(q − 1)
∑
y∈Fq,c∈V \{0}
P (e¯− e = yc)
=
1
q(q − 1) · (q − 1)
∑
c′∈V
P (e¯− e = c′)
=
1
q
.
Proof (of Proposition 1). The second claim follows directly from (1). For the
first claim, let δ = ti− tj . Then mj ∼ gδ + s0 + e¯−ea¯−a , where gδ = aδ−aδa¯−a . Now the
first claim is precisely Lemma 2.
4 Infinite family of vulnerable Galois RLWE instances
Recall that a number field K of degree n is Galois if it has exactly n automor-
phisms. In this section, we describe Galois number fields which are vulnerable to
the attack outlined in Section 2.8 In contrast to the vulnerable instances found
by computer search in Section 5 of [9], in this section we explicitly construct
infinite families of such fields with flexible parameters. Furthermore, the attacks
of [9] were successful only on instances where the size of the distribution (in the
form of the scaled standard deviation) is a small constant, where as in this paper
the scaled standard deviation parameter can be taken to be o(|d|1/4), where d is
an integer parameter and can go to infinity.
To set up, let p be an odd prime and let d > 1 be a squarefree integer such
that d is coprime to p and d ≡ 2, 3 mod 4. We choose an odd prime q such that
(1) q ≡ 1 (mod p).
(2)
(
d
q
)
= −1 (equivalently, the prime q is inert in Q(√d)).
Remark 1. Fix a pair (p, d) that satisfies the conditions described above. By
quadratic reciprocity, condition (2) on q above is a congruence condition modulo
4d. So by Dirichlet’s theorem on primes in arithmetic progressions, there exists
infinitely many primes q satisfying both (1) and (2).
Let M = Q(ζp) be the p-th cyclotomic field and L = Q(
√
d). Let K = M · L
be the composite field and let OK denote its ring of integers.
Theorem 1. Let K and q be as above, and Rq defined as in the preliminaries in
terms of K and q. Suppose q is a prime ideal in K lying over q. We consider the
reduction map ρ : R/qR→ R/qR ∼= Fqf , where f is the residue degree. Suppose
D is the RLWE error distribution with error width r such that r < 2√pid. Let
β = min
{(√
4pied
r
e−
2pid
r2
)n
, 1
}
.
Then, for x ∈ Rq drawn according to D, we have ρ(x) ∈ Fq with probability at
least 1− β.
Example 1. As a sample application of the theorem, we take d = 4871, r = 68.17
and p = 43. Then we computed β = 0.11 . . .. So if x ∈ Rq is drawn from the
error distribution, then ρ(x) ∈ Fq with probability at least 0.88.
Lemma 3 Under the notation above, we have
(1) K/Q is a Galois extension.
(2) [K : Q] = [M : Q][L : Q] = 2(p− 1).
(3) The prime q has residue degree 2 in K.
(4) OK = OM · OL = Z[ζp,
√
d].
(5) |disc(OK)| = p2(p−2)(4d)(p−1).
Proof. (1) follows from the fact that K is a composition of Galois extensions M
and L; (2) is equivalent to M ∩ L = Q, which holds because L/Q is unramified
away from primes dividing 2d and M/Q is unramified away from p; for (3), note
that our assumptions imply that q splits completely in M and is inert in L,
hence the claim. The claims (4) and (5) follow directly from [15, II. Theorem
12], and the fact that disc(OM ) = pp−2 and disc(OL) = 4d are coprime.
The following lemma is a standard upper bound on the Euclidean lengths of
samples from discrete Gaussians. It can be deduced directly from [16, Lemma
2.10].
Lemma 4 Suppose Λ ⊆ Rn is a lattice. Let DΛ,r denote the discrete Gaussian
over Λ of width r. Suppose c is a positive constant such that c > r√
2pi
. Let v be
a sample from DΛ,r. Then
Prob(||v||2 > c
√
n) ≤ Cnc/r,
where Cs = s
√
2pie · e−pis2 .
Proof (of Theorem). Part (3) of Lemma 3 implies that
1, ζp, . . . , ζ
p−2
p ;
√
d, . . . , ζp−2p
√
d (*)
is an integral basis of R = OK . By our assumptions, we have R/qR ∼= Fq2 , the
finite field of q2 elements. Under the map ρ, the first (p−1) elements of the basis
reduce to Fq, and the rest reduce to the complement Fq2 \ Fq, because d is not
a square modulo q.
Let n = p−1 be the degree of M over Q. Then the extension K/Q has degree
2n. We denote the elements in (*) by v1, . . . , vn and w1, . . . , wn. Then ||ι(vi)|| =√
2n, while ||ι(wi)|| =
√
2nd. We compute the root volume c := (vol(R))
1/n
. It
is a general fact that vol(R) = |disc(R)| 12 , so we have
c = |disc(R)| 12n =
√
2p
p−2
2(p−1) d
1
4 .
So when d p, we have ||vi||  c ||wi||. We have a decomposition R = V ⊕W ,
where V and W are free abelian groups with bases v1, . . . , vn and w1, . . . , wn,
respectively. The embeddings of V and W are orthogonal subspaces, because
Tr(viw¯j) = 0 for all i, j. For any element e ∈ R, we can write e = e1 + e2
√
d
where e1, e2 are elements of Z[ζp], and it follows that ||e||2 = ||e1||2 + d||e2||2. In
particular, if e2 6= 0, then ||e|| ≥
√
2nd.
By applying Lemma 4 with c =
√
2d, the assumptions in the statement of
our theorem imply that the probability that the discrete Gaussian Dι(R),r will
output a sample with e2 6= 0 is less than β. So the statement of theorem follows,
since e2 = 0 implies ρ(e) ∈ Fq, i.e., the image of e lies in the prime subfield.
Therefore, we can specialize the general attack in this situation as follows.
Given a set S of samples (a, b) ∈ (R/qR)2, we loop through all q2 possible guesses
g of the value s mod q and compute eg = ρ(b)− gρ(a). We then perform a chi-
square test on the set {eg : (a, b) ∈ S}, using two bins Fq and Fq2 \ Fq. If the
samples are not taken from the RLWE distribution, or if the guess is incorrect, we
expect to obtain uniform distributions; for the correct guess, we have eg = ρ(e),
and by the above analysis, if the error parameter r0 is sufficiently small, then
the chi-square test might detect non-uniformness, since the portion of elements
that lie in Fq might be larger than 1/q.
The theoretical time complexity of our attack isO(nq3): the loop runs through
q2 possible guesses. In each passing of the loop, the number of samples we need
for the chi-square test is O(q), and the complexity of computing the map ρ on
one sample is O(n). Note that using the techniques in Section 3 of this paper,
we could reduce the complexity to O(nq2).
Remark 2. It is easy to verify that if a triple (p, q, d) satisfies our assumptions,
then so does (p, q, d + 4kq) for any integer k, as long as d + 4kq is square free.
This shows one infinite family of Galois fields vulnerable to our attack.
4.1 Examples
Table 2 records some of the successful attacks we performed on the instances
described previously. In each row of Table 2, the degree of the number field is
2(p−1). Note that the runtimes are computed based on the improved version of
the attack described in Section 3 of this paper. Also, by varying the parameters
p and d, we can find vulnerable instances with r0 → ∞. For example, any
r0 = o(d
1/4/
√
p) will suffice.
Remark 3. From Table 2, we see that the the attack in practice seems to work
better (i.e., we can attack larger width r) than what is predicted in Theorem 1.
As a possible explanation, we remark that in proving the theorem we bounded
the probability of e2 = 0 from below. However, the condition e2 = 0 is sufficient
but not necessary for ρ(e) to lie in Fq, so our estimation may be a very loose
one.
Table 2. New vulnerable Galois RLWE instances
p d q r0 r no. samples runtime (in seconds)
31 4967 311 8.94 592.94 3110 144.92
43 4871 173 8.97 694.94 1730 6.44
61 4643 367 8.84 815.11 3670 205.28
83 4903 167 8.94 963.84 1670 5.74
103 4951 619 8.94 1076.32 6190 579.77
109 4919 1091 8.94 1105.44 10910 1818.82
151 100447 907 14.08 4356.02 9070 1394.18
181 100267 1087 14.11 4777.17 10870 1973.47
4.2 Remarks on other possible attacks
First, we note that the instances we found in this section are not directly attack-
able using linear algebra, as in the recent paper [8]. The reason is that although
the last n/2-coordinates of the error e under the basis (*) are small integers,
they are nonzero most of the time, so it is not clear how one can extract ex-
act linear equations from the samples. On the other hand, note that for linear
equations with small errors, there is the attack on the search RLWE problem
proposed by Arora and Ge. However, the attack requires O(nd−1) samples and
solving a linear system in O(nd) variables. Here d is the width of the discrete
error: for example, if the error can take values 0, 1, 2,−1,−2, then d = 5. Thus
the attack of Arora and Ge becomes impractical when n is larger than 102 and
d ≥ 5, say. In contrast, the complexity of our attack depends linearly on n and
quadratically on q. In particular, it does not depend on the error size (although
the success rate does depend on the error size).
5 Security of 2-power cyclotomic rings with unramified
moduli
In this section we provide some numerical evidence that for 2-power cyclotomic
rings, the image of a fairly narrow RLWE error distribution modulo an unram-
ified prime ideal q of residue degree one or two is practically indistinguishable
from uniform, implying that the 2-power cyclotomic rings are protected against
the family of attacks in this paper.
We restrict ourselves to 2-power cyclotomic rings because the geometry is
simple, namely the discrete Gaussian distribution Dι(R),
√
nr over the ring is
equivalent to a PLWE distribution, where each coefficient of the error is sampled
independently from a discrete Gaussian DZ,r over the integers.
To further aid the analysis, we make another simplifying assumption by re-
placing DZ,r in the PLWE distribution described above by a “shifted binomial
distribution”. This allows a closed form formula for a bound on the statistical
distance, and hence eases the analysis.
Let m = 2d for some integer d ≥ 1 and let K = Q(ζm) be the m-th cyclotomic
field, with degree n = m/2. Let q be a prime such that q ≡ 1 (mod m). Finally,
let q be a prime ideal above q.
Now we introduce a class of “shifted binomial distributions”.
Definition 5. For an even integer k ≥ 2, let Vk denote the distribution over Z
such that for every t ∈ Z,
Prob(Vk = t) =
{
1
2k
(
k
t+ k2
)
if |t| ≤ k2
0 otherwise
We will abuse notation and also use Vk to denote the reduced distribution Vk
(mod q) over Fq, and let νk denote its probability density function. Figure 1
shows a plot of ν8.
Fig. 1. Probability density function of V8
Definition 6. Let k ≥ 2 be an even integer. Then a sample from the distribution
Pm,k is
e =
n−1∑
i=0
eiζ
i
m,
where the coefficients ei are sampled independently from Vk.
5.1 Bounding the Distance from Uniform
We recall the definition and key properties of Fourier transform over finite fields.
Suppose f is a real-valued function on Fq. The Fourier transform of f is defined
as
f̂(y) =
∑
a∈Fq
f(a)χy(a),
where χy(a) := e
2piiay/q.
Let u denote the probability density function of the uniform distribution
over Fq, that is u(a) = 1q for all a ∈ Fq. Let δ denote the characteristic function
of the one-point set {0} ⊆ Fq. Recall that the convolution of two functions
f, g : Fq → R is defined as (f ∗g)(a) =
∑
b∈Fq f(a− b)g(b). We list without proof
some basic properties of the Fourier transform.
1. δ̂ = qu; û = δ.
2. f̂ ∗ g = f̂ · ĝ.
3. f(a) = 1q
∑
y∈Fq f̂(y)χy(a) (the Fourier inversion formula).
The following is a standard result.
Lemma 5 Suppose F and G are independent random variables with values in
Fq, having probability density functions f and g. Then the density function of
F + G is equal to f ∗ g. In general, suppose F1, . . . , Fn are mutually indepen-
dent random variables in Fq, with probability density functions f1, . . . , fn. Let f
denote the density function of the sum F =
∑
Fi, then f = f1 ∗ · · · ∗ fn.
The Fourier transform of νk has a nice closed-form formula, as below.
Lemma 6 For all even integers k ≥ 2, ν̂k(y) = cos
(
piy
q
)k
.
Proof. We have
2k · ν̂k(y) =
∑
m∈Z/qZ
 ∑
a∈Z:|aq+m|≤k/2
(
k
aq +m+ k2
) e−2piiym/q
=
k
2∑
m=− k2
(
k
m+ k2
)
e2piiym/q
= e−piiyk/q
k∑
m′=0
(
k
m′
)
e2piiym
′/q
= e−piiyk/q(1 + e2piiy/q)k = (2 cos(piy/q))k.
Dividing both sides by 2k gives the result.
Next, we concentrate on the “reduced distribution” Pm,k (mod q). Note that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between primitive m-th roots of unity in
Fq and the prime ideals above q in Q(ζm). Let α be the root corresponding to
our choice of q. Then a sample from Pm,k (mod q) is of the form
eα =
n−1∑
i=0
αiei (mod q),
where the coordinates ei are independently sampled from Vk. We abuse notations
and use eα to denote its own probability density function.
Lemma 7
êα(y) =
n−1∏
i=0
cos
(
αipiy
q
)k
.
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 6 and the independence of the coordi-
nates ei.
Lemma 8 Let f : Fq → R be a function such that
∑
a∈Fq f(a) = 1. Then for
all a ∈ Fq, the following holds.
|f(a)− 1/q| ≤ 1
q
∑
y∈Fq,y 6=0
|fˆ(y)|. (1)
Proof. For all a ∈ Fq,
f(a)− 1/q = f(a)− u(a)
=
1
q
∑
y∈Fq
(fˆ(y)− û(y))χy(a)
=
1
q
∑
y∈Fq
(fˆ(y)− δ(y))χy(a)
=
1
q
∑
y∈Fq,y 6=0
fˆ(y)χy(a). (since fˆ(0) = 1)
Now the result follows from taking absolute values on both sides, and noting
that |χy(a)| ≤ 1 for all a and all y.
Taking f = eα in Lemma 8, we immediately obtain
Theorem 2. The statistical distance between eα and u satisfies
∆(eα, u) ≤ 1
2
∑
y∈Fq,y 6=0
|êα(y)|. (2)
Now let (m, q, k, α) denote the right hand side of (2), i.e.,
(m, q, k, α) =
1
2
∑
y∈Fq,y 6=0
n−1∏
i=0
cos
(
αipiy
q
)k
.
To take into account all prime ideals above q, we let α run through all primitive
m-th roots of unity in Fq and define
(m, q, k) := max{(m, q, k, α) : α has order m in (Fq)∗}.
If (m, q, k) is negligibly small, then the distribution Pm,k (mod q) will be com-
putationally indistinguishable from uniform. We will prove the following theo-
rem.
Theorem 3. Let q,m be positive integers such that q is a prime, m is a power
of 2, q ≡ 1 mod m and q < m2. Let β = 1+
√
q
m
2 ; then 0 < β < 1 and
(m, q, k) ≤ q − 1
2
β
km
4 .
In particular, if βk/4 < 12 , then the theorem says that (m, q, k) = O(q2
−m)
as m→∞.
Corollary 1. The statistical distance between Pm,k modulo q and a uniform
distribution is bounded above, independently of the choice of q above q, by
q − 1
2
(
1 +
√
q
m
2
) km
4
.
To prepare proving the theorem, we set up some notations of Shparlinski in
[18]. Let Ω = (ωj)
∞
j=1 be a sequence of real numbers and let m be a positive
integer. We define the following quantities:
– LΩ(m) =
∏m
j=1(1− exp(2piiωj))
– SΩ(m) =
∑m
j=1 exp(2piiωj).
The following lemma is a special case of [18, Theorem 2.4].
Lemma 9
|LΩ(m)| ≤ 2m/2(1 + |SΩ(m)|/m)m/2.
Proof (of Theorem 3). We specialize the above discussion to our situation, where
m is a power of 2 and n = m/2. We fix ωk =
αk−1y
q + 1/2, where we abuse
notations and let α denote a lift of α ∈ Fq to Z.
Lemma 10 We have
|LΩ(n)| = 2n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∏
j=0
cos
(
αjpiy
q
)∣∣∣∣∣∣
and |LΩ(m)| = |LΩ(n)|2.
Proof. We have LΩ(n) =
∏n
j=1(1− e2pii(α
j−1y/q+1/2)) =
∏n−1
j=0 (1 + e
2piiαjy/q). So
|LΩ(n)| =
∏n−1
j=0
∣∣e−piiαjy/q + epiiαjy/q)∣∣ = ∏n−1j=0 2 ∣∣Re(epiiαjy/q)∣∣, which is equal
to 2n
∣∣∏n−1
j=0 cos
(
αjpiy/q
)∣∣. Similarly, |LΩ(m)| = 2m|∏m−1j=0 cos(αjpiy/q)|. Since
αn ≡ −1 mod q we have cos(αj+npiy/q) = cos(αjpiy/q) for 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. The
claim now follows.
On the other hand, we have SΩ(m) = −
∑m−1
j=0 exp
(
2piiαjy
q
)
, and standard
bound on Gauss sums says that |SΩ(m)| ≤ q1/2. Now combining Lemma 9 and
Lemma 10, we get ∣∣∣∣∣
n−1∏
i=0
cos
(
αipiy
q
)∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ βn/2
for β as defined in the statement of the theorem and for any nonzero y ∈ Fq.
Our result in the theorem now follows from taking both sides to k-th power and
summing over y.
5.2 Numerical Distance from Uniform
We have computed (m, q, k) for various choices of parameters. Smaller values
of  imply that the error distribution looks more uniform when transferred to
R/q, rendering the instance of RLWE invulnerable to the attacks in [9].
The data in Table 3 shows that when n ≥ 100 and the size of the modulus
q is polynomial in n, the statistical distances between Pm,k (mod q) and the
uniform distribution are negligibly small. Also, note that we fixed k = 2, and
the epsilon values becomes even smaller when k increases.
For each instance in Table 3, we also generated the actual RLWE samples
(where we fixed r0 =
√
2pi) and ran the chi-square attack of [9] using confidence
level α = 0.99. The column labeled “χ2” contains the χ2 values we obtained,
and the column labeled “uniform?” indicates whether the reduced errors are
uniform. We can see from the data how the practical situation agrees with our
analysis on the approximated distributions.
It is possible to generalize our discussion in this section to primes of arbitrary
residue degree f , in which case the Fourier analysis will be performed over the
field Fqf . The only change in the definitions would be χy(a) = e
2piiTr(ay)
q . Here
Tr : Fqf → Fq is the trace function. Similarly, we have
ê′α(y) =
n∏
i=1
cos
(
piTr
(
αiy
)
q
)k
.
Table 4 contains some data for primes of degree two.
Table 3. Values of (m, q, 2) and the χ2 values
m (n = m/2) q −[log2((m, q, 2))] χ2 uniform?
64 193 40 167.6 yes
128 1153 97 1125.6 yes
256 3329 194 3350.0 yes
512 10753 431 10732.8 yes
Table 4. Values of (m, q, 2) for primes of degree two
m (n = m/2) q −[log2((m, q, 2))]
64 383 31
128 1151 54
256 1279 159
512 5583 341
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